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Abstract
This essay contends that radical constructivism makes a mistake by focusing on cognition at the
expense of where cognitive phenomena surface: in the interactive use of language. By contrast, it
advocates a radically social constructivism grounded in the conversational nature of being human. It also
urges to abandon the celebration of observation, inherited from the enlightenment’s preoccupation with
description, in favor of participation, the recognition that speaking and writing are acts of continuously
reconstructing reality, only partly conceivable by participants yet interactively realized.
It distinguishes between conversation as observed and conversation as articulated by its participants. It
postulates accountability as a chief conversational move through which conversations can regain their
natural flow when disturbed and construct inherently ethical realities for their participants. Unwillingness
to repair problematic conversations amounts to acquiescence to constraints that are typical of
discourses and the construction of institutional realities. It suggests that the ultimate institutionalization
consists of replacing institutional artifacts by computational ones, which was the aim of early
cybernetics. Computational artifacts have no agency and cannot be held accountable for what they do.
This essay proposes a continuum of possible discourses between authentic conversation and
computation. It concludes by calling for drawing finer distinctions within that continuum and expresses
the hope for not closing off the possibility of returning to authentic conversation where humans realize
their being human, not institutional actors or machines.
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Conversation
Possibilities of its Repair and Descent into Discourse and Computation
Klaus Krippendorff A University of Pennsylvania, USA <kkrippendorff@asc.upenn.edu>

R Context: This essay contends that radical constructivism makes a mistake in focusing
on cognition at the expense of where cognitive phenomena surface: in the interactive use
of language. R Goal: It grounds radically social constructivism by exploring the conversational nature of being human. It also urges abandoning the celebration of observation,
inherited from the enlightenment’s preoccupation with description, in favor of participation, the recognition that speaking and writing are acts of continuously reconstructing
reality, which is only partly conceivable yet is interacted with. R Method: It distinguishes
between conversation as observed and conversation as articulated by its participants. It
postulates accountability as a chief conversational move through which conversations can
regain their natural flow when disturbed and construct inherently ethical realities for their
participants. Unwillingness to repair problematic conversations amounts to acquiescence
to constraints that are typical of discourses and the construction of institutional realities.
R Implications: It suggests that the ultimate institutionalization consists of replacing
institutional artifacts with computational ones, which was the aim of early cybernetics.
Computational artifacts have no agency and cannot be held accountable for what they do.
This essay proposes a continuum of possible discourses between authentic conversation
and computation. It concludes by calling for the drawing of finer distinctions within that
continuum and expresses the hope for not closing off the possibility of returning to authentic conversation where humans realize their being human – rather than institutional actors
or machines. R Key words: Language, institutions, conversation, computation, participation, cybernetics.

Introduction
In my answer to Ernst von Glasersfeld’s
(2008) question, “Who conceives of society?,”
I proposed a radically social constructivism
(Krippendorff 2008a) that overcomes what I
perceive to be an unfortunate cognitivism in
von Glasersfeld’s, Heinz von Foerster’s, and
Humberto Maturana’s work. Since then, I
published two other papers on the subject.
One (2008b) moves the notion of human
agency into the center of my project, focusing
on its role in conceptions of social organizations – a concept less grand than “society”;
one (2008c) teases out several reflexive turns
that have grown in cybernetics but cannot be
subsumed by the epistemology of radical constructivism and second-order cybernetics,
which privileges observation and a representational theory of language over participation
in conversation and cooperative construc-

tions of reality. In all of these efforts, conversation has become the starting point of my
conceptualizations of being human. In this
essay, I wish to discuss what conversation
entails, how it is maintained, and under which
conditions it degenerates into something else.
Since Martin Heidegger, many philosophers have based their work on the contention
that humans live in language. I concur with
this proposition but must warn that there are
several conceptions of language (Volosinov
1986) and it is important to be clear about the
specific conception of language when subscribing to such a proposition. Linguistic conceptions of language are largely due to Ferdinand de Saussure’s (1916) unfortunate but
consequential distinction between “langue”
and “parole.” For him, langue, the French
word for language, is the relatively enduring
system of rules and conventions common to all
of its speakers, and parole, the French word for
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speaking, is what speakers do with language.
The latter is considered full of idiosyncrasies,
marred by individual incompetencies, entirely
situational, messy, difficult to study, and hence
excluded from the object that linguistics constructs and calls language. Also, for Saussure,
langue and parole are what individuals speak.
That we always speak in the expectation of
being understood by those addressed, in social
relations with others, not merely expressing
our experiences to the world. Inter-individual
relationships do not enter traditional linguistic inquiries, socio-linguistics nudging
excepted. In my view, linguists study a convenient abstraction from processes of conversations, purporting to be the systematic and
conventional structure that governs individual speakers. It construes that abstraction as
the government of individual speech.
For me, Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela’s (1980, 1987) term “languaging,”
or “the use of language,” brings the linguist
abstraction back to where it is embodied, in
real people speaking with each other. Languaging is a process of mutual human engagement. It is not just a biological capability. Languaging has a history: developmentally, in the
sense that individual humans learn it from
each other; etymologically, in the sense that
spoken utterances and written words have lineages that go back generations of uses by
largely unrecognized cultural ancestors; and
ontogenetically, in the sense that it goes hand
in glove with the evolution and use of cultural
artifacts. Languaging is a social or inter-personal phenomenon, not a cognitive one.
For Ludwig Wittgenstein (1953; Schulte
1992), language is a game we play with each
other, and the meaning of its words is the history of acquiring their use. When we learn a
language, we learn to coordinate ourselves
with present others. This is quite consistent
with Maturana’s (1988) conception of language as the con-sensual coordination of consensual coordinations of actions. The dash
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between “con” and “sensual” is mine and is
intended to highlight the jointly sensing of
(focusing on) something and each other by
speakers, and to prevent the common reading
of “consensual” as relating to consensus or
agreement. Playing soccer, for example,
requires much coordination among players
relative to a moving ball. But what makes handling that ball a soccer game has much to do
with the interpretation of written rules, for
example, by referees who must declare something to be a violation or a scored goal, or
which team won.
I contend that Wittgenstein’s choice of the
game metaphor may not have been an entirely
happy one as it suggests language as a means
of accomplishing something; a tool, for example, to decide who won the game. Surely this
is not what he implied. Rather, his language
games do not need to be finite and may well
be ongoing, a “way of life” in which people
have the courage to change their being with
each other. I have similar misgiving with the
idea of language as the coordination of coordinations of actions. Language does not control anything. Speakers interact with each
other and define themselves interactively, not
as individual actors, but as participants, acting jointly (Shotter 1993). Even in a soccer
game, not all participants are eager to win the
game. Besides the two teams of players,
including their coaches, there are referees,
audiences, field owners, and their employees,
whose diverse realities are necessary but not
questioned during a game. As Wittgenstein
reminds us, using language does something.
In the process of speaking, realities are cooperatively created and maintained in which
speakers constitutively participate in relation
to each other. Human relations, soccer games,
cities, and technologies are interactive accomplishments, cognition always playing only a
part in them. What individual soccer players
have in mind may well affect the outcome of
the game but does not determine its end.
In (2008c), I worked towards the conclusion that cybernetics is an interdisciplinary discourse that brings radically reflexive realities
into being, which includes attention to a host
of familiar constructions from feedback
loops, self-references, recursions, autonomies, to its own constructive use of language.
There I suggested that second-order cyberneticians do not go far enough when they merely
reflect on their observations, taking responsi-
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bility for observing, constructing realities,
and describing that process to others. The
idea that observers observe their observations
abstracts individual capabilities from the fabric of conversations in which observations
become inter-individually meaningful and in
which constructions of reality become coordinated among interlocutors. I am suggesting
that the realities we say we see or think we
know are not mere cognitive constructions,
they become intelligible and are continually
shaped in conversations. The point is that
words do something (Austin 1962), organizations are performed in conversations (Krippendorff 2008b), and theories can change the
very world they claim to describe, right in
front of their theorists’ eyes (Krippendorff
2009: 112–130) with reality conforming to or
running away from the unreflected belief in
its representation in language.
For this reason, I prefer not to ground my
argument in a radical constructivist conception of reality as a cognitive construction, or in
its objectivist counterpart: that physical or
biological reality affords (explains) our perception. To me, physicists construct a universe
for the sole convenience of getting answers to
their questions (Werner Heisenberg: “What
we observe is not nature itself, but nature
exposed to our method of questioning”).
Physics becomes foundational when insisting
that the reality it constructs underlies everything else. Similarly, biology becomes foundational when claiming that the living systems
that biologists construct underlie all human
sciences. Foundationalisms are often maintained by denying the discourses in which they
are claimed. All questions and answers, truth
claims, theories, and conceptions are articulated in conversations; not realizing them as
arguments or claims diverts attention from
how realities are socially constructed to what
results from that process, from what we
humans create to what we dare not question.
The conception of causality, for example – the
backbone of physical explanations – has no
place for human agency. The conception of
autopoiesis – basic to biology – is entirely
optional to, has no effect on how beings organize their lives. Finally, cognitive autonomy,
which underlies radical constructivists’ explanations of human cognitive abilities, is an
epiphenomenon of conversations and other
forms of interaction. Cognitive phenomena
cannot be observed, least of all located in

someone’s brain. They become manifest in
institutionalized vocabularies that psychological experimenters can elicit from their subjects – experiences, understandings, conceptual models, intentions, and other individual
abilities – omitting the essentially linguistic,
social, interactive, embodied, and ongoing
nature of the situation in which such data
emerge as co-constructed.
In his paper, Producing a Cognition,
Charles Antaki (2006) gives a good example
of an interview that is designed to test the cognitive ability of respondents. It starts with an
interviewee’s denial of having any knowledge
of where his money comes from. But after
interacting with the interviewer, the interviewee ends up constructing an answer that
satisfies both the interviewer and the respondent. This is one of many conclusive demonstrations for cognition to be constructed
interactively and in language. Here, cognition
is housed neither in the mind of the interviewee nor in that of the interviewer.
I am suggesting that all sciences are practiced in constrained conversations, in discourse, as I will detail below. They create and
rearticulate their objects so as to be observable and rearticulable within their respective
discourse communities. Contrary to convenient but questionable beliefs that their
objects precede attention to them, I contend
that the realities the sciences describe are the
artifacts of constrained conversational practices by their communities. Almost everything we think we know, plan, build, and use
emerges from disciplined verbal and non-verbal interactions.
It makes sense, therefore, to ground this
essay in where questions are asked, truth
claims are negotiated, and realities are coconstructed, that is, in conversations. This is
where physical, biological, cognitive, linguistic, and sociological realities are created and
take hold of the imaginations of diverse communities whose members listen to, live with,
and enact these conversational realities. I am
assuming that we humans, like all animals, are
constituted in togetherness as a condition of
our existence, not in biological or cognitive
functioning. For some species, togetherness is
short lived, consisting of coincidental coupling, birthing, and temporary caring. For us
humans, togetherness is richer. It involves
interactively coordinated languaging during
which we are constantly reminded that our
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engagement with each other has a history that
precedes our participation in it and this history inevitably resonates in ongoing conversations. Conversation is one explanation that
constitutes itself in practicing human togetherness.
The following two sections describe conversation from two contrasting positions. The
first applies von Foerster and Maturana’s variously articulated conception of a standard
scientific observer (here of conversation)
whose aim is to be conscious of his or her acts
of observing and describing his or her observations/constructions to others. The second
takes the position of a participant in conversations whose competencies reside in contributing to what is happening there. The difference between these two positions is not
found in the difference between objective and
subjective accounts of the same phenomena
but between outsider and insider accounts.
All accounts occur in conversations and are
offered in the first position by one observer
(of conversations) to a community of other
observers, and in the second position by participants in the very process to be accounted
for. I am using the second section not only as
a critique of the first, showing the epistemological limitations of celebrating observers
and observations, but also as a reference to
what happens when conversation degenerates
into something else.

Conversation observed
Morphologically, “con-” means together,
joint, or among, and “-versation” has many
roots, from making “verse” out of experiences
as poets do, being “conversant” in a subject
matter, to a “version,” translation or interpretation of something, including of reality. The
Oxford English Dictionary (1991: 868) traces
“Conversation” to the 12th century and gives
its earliest meaning as “The action of living or
having one’s being in a place of or among persons” and “The action of consorting or having
dealings with others; living together; commerce, intercourse, society, intimacy.” In the
16th century, conversation became “Interchange of thoughts and words; familiar discourse or talk.” This etymology suggests the
meaning of conversation to be remarkably
stable. Its overriding use as a way of being
together in talk and interaction serves me well.
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Contrasting dialogue with writing, I suggested: Everything said is said in the expectation of being understood by an addressee.
Everything heard as being said is taken as
having been said by one person to another.
Understanding does not need to be mutual
and shared, but needs to be complementary
in how it is performed (Krippendorff 2009:
159). Minimally, conversation requires two
participants in interlacing expectations.
Charles Goodwin (1981: 4), citing Erving
Goffman (1976), differentiates three listeners to talk. Those who overhear a conversation without being part of it and without the
expectation or ability to respond, those who
are part of a conversation and (in case of
three or more participants) are addressed by
the speaker and expected to respond, or
those not addressed and not expected to
respond. Goffman and Goodwin thought of
overhearers as casual bystanders. I am
including as bystanders the observers of conversations – for example, through a one-way
mirror – the listeners to wire tapped telephone conversations, the viewers of verbal
interactions on a movie screen, and, most
important here, the conversation analysts,
typically working from transcripts of naturally occurring talk. The latter are scientific
observers of conversation and I maintain
their view is necessarily unlike the view of
involved participants.
As a scientific observer, overhearing and
recording conversations from their outside,
Robert Nofsinger (1991) considers conversations as:
B Mundane activities among those observed together. Everyone is able to engage in
conversation with others without specialized
knowledge, preparation or equipment. This
observation may need to be qualified by noting that conversation is learned. Mothers
incessantly talk to their babies, initially
pleased to get at least a smile in response. It
is not clear how babies or children listen, but
in time, their participation becomes richer
and entirely natural or mundane. Then
Nofsinger’s observation applies.
B Common occurrences. Conversations
are observed everywhere, at home, at work,
while shopping, in public places, on the telephone, and between waking up in the morning and exchanging intimacies with a partner at night. While mostly taking place
among acquaintances, conversations also

occur among strangers such as when waiting
in line for a cashier or in a doctor’s office.
B Interactively unfolding in time. Participants take turns and respond to each other’s
utterances. A conversation essentially is a
sequential activity. It creates its own history.
This history can be recorded, videotaped,
transcribed, and examined in detail, providing analyzable data.
B Locally managed. During the course of
a conversation, participants themselves determine who speaks, for how long, and in which
order. Responsibility for maintaining a conversation is distributed among those present.
B Accompanied by other activities. Participants do not merely say something to each
other when they talk. They also do something
at the same time. Activities may include nonverbal expressions – gestures, eye contact,
variations in voice – but they also establish
relationships among speakers and coordinate
parallel activities. Conversations between the
pilot and copilot direct an airplane’s flight;
within a team of designers, result in a novel
technology; between therapist and a client,
produce new realities, ostensively for the client but in fact for both; among business partners, shape actionable agreements; or among
the employees of a social organization, determine what that organization is and how
everyone contributes to it. Conversations
coordinate the realities of everyday life.
Other scholars consider conversations as:
B Extendable to mediated activities.
Although speaking a language is acquired in
the bodily presence of others in conversation,
once learned, conversations can continue
through interactive media, between participants out of sight of each other. Exchanging
written letters, once the only form of mediated conversation, is being replaced by telephone conversations, online discussions,
email, and texting. While all mediated conversations omit some features of face-to face
conversations – sight in telephone conversations, identity in some text-based internet
discussions – they always extend desirable
dimensions – distance, for example. Yet, even
in mediated conversations, participants are
aware of each other.
Academic interests in conversations
assume conversations to be
B Analyzable and theorizable, usually
from recordings and transcripts that allow
the conversation analyst to examine and
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reexamine the data for patterns that may otherwise escape even the most attentive listening, or in the case of mediated conversations,
casual reading.
Theories based on such data always are
and cannot be anything other than the theories of observers, not of the observed participants – unless the latter articulate their theory
in use, which is rare. However, the position of
observers and participants should not be confused on epistemological grounds. Also, theories always reflect the disciplinary interests
of theorists in a limited aspect of the available
data. For example, therapists typically look
for clues to a diagnosis of their clients’ mental
problems, ignoring everything else, including
their own creative contributions to this end.
Employers may examine interview data to
predict whether an interviewee will fit their
job description; cognitive scientists select
from verbal interactions that which allows
them to infer what is going on in participants’
minds. Conversation analysts are not
immune to such limitations either when seeking to invent rules that could explain the organization of talk and exchange of written messages, except that their theories tend not to
aim at generalizations but are satisfied with
moment-to-moment explanations.
It is often taken for granted that conversation analysts can hardly proceed without
speaking the language of the participants in
observed conversations, nor can they succeed
without conversational experiences on their
own. Even the transcripts they prepare are
cultural artifacts that speak of the analysts’
competencies to engage in and write down
what they observe. Reliance on such data
questions the detachment that conversation
analysts seek to project in their analyses and
explanations.
Insightful analysts may well have been
part of the very conversations they subsequently analyze. Goodwin (1981), for example, taped many birthday parties and gatherings among friends, bringing insider
experiences into his analysis. But being
forced to demonstrate the validity of a conversation analysis in terms of quotes from
transcripts or clips from video recordings
encourages explanations of sequential interactions, turn taking, and how categories of
utterances follow each other. Such sequential
data lead some analysts to causal explanations, for example, John Searle (1969) and
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other speech act theorists invoke “illocutionary forces” to explain what speech acts do;
Gordon Pask (1975, 1976) relies on computational explanations of conversations. Such
explanations make sense from the position of
an observer who has no direct access to the
choices that participants exercise and what
motivated them. All they can work from is
how observations follow each other.
While acknowledging local management
as a defining feature of conversations, what
conversation analysts easily overlook is their
inability to account for what is happening
inside conversations. Self-organizing systems, by definition, develop their own identities, their own realities, and their own
meanings for what occurs within their
boundaries. For outsiders, it is extraordinarily difficult, perhaps impossible, to explain
why participants say what they say and how a
conversation develops the way it does, except
for the above-mentioned possibility of asking
questions of the participants, in effect intervening in the conversation of interest, thus
bringing their own conversational experiences into the very conversation to be analyzed.
By analyzing the transcripts of conversations, conversation analysts notice patterns
that may mean nothing to participants inside
conversations. To claim that participants in
conversation are unaware of the patterns that
conversation analysts are “discovering,” or
more correctly, “constructing,” is epistemologically untenable – unless analysts step out
of their observer role, explore their hypotheses with the participants in a conversation,
and thus become conversationally involved,
leaving their preferred observer role. In the
social sciences, participant accounts largely
are considered unreliable and not born out by
observational facts. Preservation of objectivity was one reason for linguistics to exclude
parole and conversations from their object of
study. Conversation analysts are not committed to the abstract-objectivist notions of language (Volosinov 1986) that linguists pursue
but also shy away from becoming conversationally involved in their object of analysis.
To appreciate the severe limitations of
understanding conversations by overhearing
or observing conversations from the outside,
let me now describe, as far as possible, conversation from within the process, as a participant.

Authentic conversation
In existential philosophy, authenticity has to
do with being true to one’s self despite pressures from society to be otherwise. There,
authenticity is celebrated as an individualist
ideal that denies the conversational reality of
being human. I am using authenticity here to
refer to the pleasure of participating in
togetherness in which one is free to speak for
oneself, not in the name of absent others, not
under pressure to say things one does not
believe in, and not having to hide something
for fear of being reprimanded or excluded
from further conversations. But I will be more
specific than that.
Authentic conversation is not easily, if at
all, identifiable from the outside. How would
an observer access someone’s construction in
progress, why something is said, and what is
not being said? Questions of this kind should
not be dismissed as being subjective. Inasmuch as participants in conversations can be
asked and may be willing to account for their
feelings, the act of making them public, where
they can be dealt with in the very conversations that elicit them, renders feelings – supposedly subjective – inter-subjectively acceptable. One is reminded of Wittgenstein’s
argument against private language. Participant accounts are not only richer in meaning
and closer to what is going on inside a conversation than their observable manifestations,
but also more predictable of how a conversation unfolds – at least to the satisfaction of the
participants.
Participants in authentic conversations –
whether as speakers or listeners, and in case of
the latter, whether addressed and expected to
respond or waiting for their turn – may experience conversations as:
B Occurring in the presence of addressable
and responsive individuals. In authentic conversations, participants distinguish themselves and each other by the contributions
they make to them. The act of distinguishing
oneself is public. It does not impose identities
on others, which is what observers are destined to do. When participants cannot be seen
as addressable or the source of their voices
cannot be distinguished – for example, when
in a large and anonymous crowd – conversation is no longer authentic.
B Maintaining mutual understanding. In
conversations, mutuality, agreement, and
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coordination of understanding and acting are
of central concern for all participants. However, since cognition cannot be observed and
nobody can compare their own understanding with that of others, in conversations,
understanding or the lack of it, is performative and evident in certain speech acts, such as
“I understand,” “I agree,” or “tell me more.”
Here, acknowledging understanding does not
mean similarity or sharing of conceptions, its
affirmation constitutes an invitation to go on,
including to other subjects.
Observers, by contrast, are effectively
excluded from the possibilities of checking
their understanding of what they overhear
against the performative understanding
among participants in conversation. In this
respect, analysts of transcripts of conversations or written exchanges are literally “out of
the loop,” isolated, and responsive, at most, to
their scientific community of equally
detached observers.
B Self-organizing and constituted in the
contributions their participants make to each
other. Conversations are communicationally
closed. They are not abstracted from anything. They are embodied in real participants’
talking and listening to each other, responding to what they heard, and acting accordingly. The identity of a conversation – dinner
conversation, political deliberation therapeutic session, focus group discussion, business
meeting, or design project – emerges from
talk and text generated within that conversation. With the emergence of conversational
identities comes the feeling of being part of it,
referring to its participants by the inclusive
“we.” How the responsibility to maintain the
flow of conversational moves is distributed
among participants and the direction in
which a conversation is going is always uncertain – save for one’s own contribution.
Among participants, this uncertainty is not a
deficiency, however. Participants trust each
other to make sense of what is said.
Observers who seek to understand a conversation from a recording of what happened,
looking at it from a God’s eye view, cannot
possibly appreciate the feeling of being part of
it, the feeling of being able to shape an always
evolving conversation, and the feeling of
trusting each other to maintain the flow. As
Michael Billig (2006) noted, we have a rich
vocabulary of inner processes – feelings,
thoughts, attitudes, experiences, memories
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and reasons – in terms of which psychologists
construct the cognitive processes of their
interest without being observable. However,
it is because the conversational use of these
words is public and coordinated with other
speakers of a language that they become
meaningful in conversations, not as description of individual states but as performing
certain speech acts.
B Intuitive, not rule governed. Authentic
conversations are embodied practices. Turn
taking, topic switching, coordination of reality
constructions is natural, requiring no reflection, no preparation, no special training – as
Nofsinger said, notwithstanding the fact that
children, born into a community, need to learn
joining its conversations. Children do not learn
rules, however, and then apply them. They
learn to interact with others by speaking much
like how they see and hear others interacting
with them. Authentic conversations do not follow rules; they give birth to further conversations. Only after sufficient conversational competencies are acquired is it possible to talk of
improper practices – “do not interrupt,” “don’t
be rude,” or “listen!” from which conversational conventions may emerge. But authentic
conversations may go on without them.
Conversation theorists may well draw useful distinctions from the transcripts of conversations, for example, by analyzing conversational triples and adjacency pairs,
formulating and testing hypotheses about
how natural conversations are organized
(Goodwin, 1981), postulating conversational
maxims (Grice, 1975, 1978), or theorizing a
universal pragmatics for ideal speech situations (Habermas, 1970, 2001). But all of these
grand theoretical precepts are constructions
by and for outsiders to conversations.
Conversation analysts have the tendency to
claim that participants implicitly follow the
rules they have invented. This claim is epistemologically preposterous, however. Drawing
on Sigmund Freud, Billig (2006) makes a useful distinction between the unconscious and
the preconscious. The former is an observer’s
construction of cognition that is inaccessible
to an observed individual (and often related to
oppression). The latter is an observer’s construction of what that individual does not attend to at the moment, takes for granted while
conversing with others. But from the perspective of social construction, there is the possibility that conversation analytic vocabularies en-

ter a conversation and start coordinating participants’ talk whether of cognitive conditions
or conversational rules. In other words, while
the results of conversation analysis may not
have anything to do with how conversation is
practiced, teaching conversation theoretical explanations diverts practitioners’ attention from what they had been doing naturally.
B Dialogically equal. By dialogical equality I mean that every participant in a conversation has the possibility of contributing to it.
Nobody feels excluded. Every contribution,
even silence, is respected and appropriately
responded to.
Indeed, participation is rarely observed
equal. Some participants inevitably speak
more than others do, leading to claims of
observed power inequalities within conversations. Moreover, participants usually have
unequal resources (experiences) to contribute. Turn taking is inherently asymmetrical.
However, such interpretations of observed
differences in frequencies as indicators of inequalities may not matter to insiders to whom
unequal experiences may not be detrimental
to authentic conversations, more likely, they
are what keeps a conversation alive. Even without making an observable contribution, the
perception of being able to contribute when
the opportunity arises and be accepted for
what one says is all that matters. Needless to
say, dialogical equality is not observable from
outside a conversation. Participants may not
notice it either but might articulate its lack.
B Creating possibilities of participation.
Conversations may well take place while
doing a job. But besides correlations with a
purpose, conversations are inherently creative, offering participants possibilities to
contribute and realize themselves in the contributions they and others make to the process. One obvious example of opening possibilities of participation is to raise questions
not previously answered, inviting addressees
to construct answers. Conversational possibilities expand when participants assure each
other that their contributions are understood,
important, and appreciated (Brown &
Levinson 1987), and that their creativity is
appreciated. Creating and maintaining possibilities for others relates to von Foerster’s
(1981: 308) ethical imperative: “Act always so
as to increase the number of choices.” Here, I
am embedding his imperative in the context
of social interactions. Socially relevant
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choices, not their numbers, are the gifts that
partners in communication can offer each
other (Krippendorff 2009: 34).
Obviously, possibilities can be created,
pondered, exhausted, and constrained, but
not observed. It should also be noted that not
all questions may invite participation, as I
shall discuss below.
B Irreversible, progressive, and unique.
For participants, conversations never
repeat themselves. Each turn is experienced as
unique; each utterance reveals its speakers’
shifting perspectives. As Heraclitus suggested,
“you cannot step in the same river twice.” Participants have numerous conversational
moves available to alert each other to redundant threads: “here we go again!” “didn’t you
already tell that story,” “old news,” etc. Indeed,
it makes no sense to repeat stories unless they
have been forgotten or decisions unless they
have not been followed up or been previously
undone.
For conversation analysts, each transcript
may well be unique as well. However, scientific
analysis calls for the identification of recurrent
pattern and generalizations at the cost of
excluding the very uniqueness to which the
participants in conversations respond.
Observers tend to be blind to the unique contributions made in conversations. Participants
tend to be blind to the repetitions they take for
granted. Evidently, observers and participants
construct realities that are orthogonal to each
other but not necessarily incompatible.
B Coordinating constructions of reality.
Conversations always leave artifacts behind,
minimally the memories of their own history.
Other artifacts include the always evolving
relationships among participants. But most
important are the changes that participants
introduce into the world while being in and
after participating in conversations: decisions
with practical consequences, institutionalizations of procedures, projects, designs or texts,
and realizations of diverse technologies.
Rarely do these artifacts correspond to any
one individual’s cognition. Participants supplement each other’s contributions (Gergen
1994). Indeed, furniture, cars, computers, the
internet and cities are designed in the course
of many conversations, having long histories
with changing participants but a common
thread. Conceptions of these artifacts need
not be shared and mostly cannot be articulated in full by any one individual but may
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complement each other in the interactions
that set these artifacts in motion.
Conversation theorists cannot achieve
such coordinations for their theories – unless
they join the conversation they are theorizing
and become active participants, no longer
observers. Similarly, theorists of technology
are comfortable in describing the histories of
technological developments, but rarely appreciate the multiple conversational grounds of
such developments, much less dare to forecast
technological developments. The belief in
technological determinism is an extreme case
of denying the role of language and social
interaction that drives such developments.
B Continuable in principle. From
the
perspective of external observers, conversations may be short, such as between occupants of neighboring seats on a city bus, terminating when they no longer sit next to each
other, or long, such as between teenage
friends who talk for hours on the telephone.
For observers, both examples are finite in
time. But what they have in common is the
possibility of their continuation at a later
time, at a different place, and perhaps including new participants, no matter what has happened in between separate encounters. When
children move out of their family – for
instance, when they go to college – and stay in
touch with their family members and friends
by telephone, email, or text messaging, they
continue to weave the conversational realities
they had started long ago, albeit by different
means, across geographical distances, and
under continuously changing circumstances.
Conversations can terminate when they
degenerate into other forms of interactions,
incompatible with the above, and, in the
extreme, when violence enters, which is a categorically different way of being together.
Evidently, there are vast differences
between how participants see themselves in
authentic conversations and what outside
observers, conversation analysts, can record,
analyze, articulate, and theorize. The two
positions are con-sensually different, distinguished by unlike epistemologies, unlike relationships to their objects of attention, and
unlike experiences with the subject matter of
talk or writing. I am not devaluing the position of the conversation analyst, but wish to
highlight that their reality constructions necessarily differ from the ones of those who are
conversationally involved with each other.

Accountability and
possibilities of repairs
The above depicts conversations as self-organizing and unproblematic verbal and nonverbal interactions among participants,
including the constructions of reality they
produce. Authentic conversation is typical
among trusting friends but also among
strangers who, having nothing to lose, feel
alive in each other’s presence. I do not expect
participants able to describe what authentic
conversation entails – as I tried above – but to
become aware when disruptions of it are
experienced.
In everyday life, people do not always
respond in perfect alignment to each other.
We say things that may not be understood as
intended, interrupt someone’s turn, offend
someone without wanting to, or talk too
much and thereby preempt others from
speaking their mind. Besides such unintended disruption of unproblematic interactions, we know of systematic and institutionalized disruptions that we may notice when
they occur but fail to address for a variety of
reasons. I maintain that conversational competencies include ample possibilities to repair
problematic conversational sequences within
them. Whether or not we utilize these linguistic resources and how aware we are of these
possibilities is a big question that I cannot
answer here. Often it is only after encountering the efforts of others to repair problematic
conversations that we are made aware of how
we deviate from authentic conversation –
without implying the ability to articulate just
how a conversation got astray. Possibly the
most important linguistic resource for repairing disruptions of authentic conversations is
accountability.
I contend that everything said is said not
only in the expectation of being understood
by addressees but also in the expectation of
being held accountable for what was said or
done. As John Shotter (1984, 1993) suggests,
speakers tend to articulate their contributions
to a conversation not merely in response to
other speakers but also with possible accounts
in mind in case their contributions are challenged. The process of holding participants
accountable may be initiated by noting an
infelicitous, untoward, or problematic conversational move, action, or sequence of
exchanges. Expressing dis-ease with some-
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one’s contribution – sometimes called metacommunication – amounts to a momentary
disruption of that flow and implies a request
for an account by the presumed source of that
dis-ease. Requests for an account may also be
made directly: “Why did you say that?” “What
do you want to accomplish with that proposal? “Why do you come so late?” The
account subsequently given is then evaluated
and either accepted or rejected, and in case of
the latter, a new account may be requested,
until the issue is resolved (Buttny 1993).
The most typical accounts are explanations, justifications, excuses (Mills 1940; Scott
& Lyman 1968), and apologies. The interactions they set in motion are part of the conversation. They differ from the unproblematic
flow of a conversation by focusing on the
interaction in question, not on what they construct.
B Explanations are least disruptive of
conversations. They respond to assertions
such as “I don’t understand” “I am not following you,” and questions such as “can you clarify?” or “what do you mean by that?” Explanations, once accepted as making sense, have the
effect of coordinating participants’ understanding performatively and bringing a conversation back to an unproblematic flow.
Good explanations rearticulate or expand
what had been said in terms compatible with
listeners’ background of understanding.
B Justifications acknowledge a speaker’s
agency in an actual or anticipated happening,
and respond to expressed doubts of the merit
of that happening. Justifications may be
defensive when responding to challenges or
preparatory when actions are proposed with
the intent to seek approval. Often justifications are used to enroll listeners into the
speaker’s project (Krippendorff 2008b). Once
justifications are accepted, conversation can
proceed to other topics.
B Excuses, by contrast, deny a speaker’s
or actor’s agency, intention, or involvement in
what happened and offer grounds for not
being responsible for it. Typical excuses are
appeals to external causes, lack of knowledge,
accidents, being under the influence of drugs,
or having acted on the orders of a superior.
The latter may shift blame to someone else,
which is a common diversion. If accepted,
excuses render speakers blameless and enable
them to continue their participation in the
conversation. Excuses rely on narratives that
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are intended to be compelling, but not necessarily true by extra-conversational standards.
Excuses do not change the condition for
which they are offered.
B Apologies admit responsibility for an
offensive conversational move or action,
express regret, and imply the promise not to
repeat it in the future. Unlike excuses, apologies admit the actor’s agency. Accepting an
apology forgives the perpetrators of offensive
conversational moves or actions and is a way
to continue the conversation in the hope that
the offense will not recur.
Shotter’s (1984, 1993) observation that all
speakers talk in the expectation of being held
accountable by listeners for what they say and
do applies to the act of giving accounts as well.
Accounts too are always articulated in the
hope of being accepted and only those that
have that chance are offered. Although
accounts may well appeal to general conventions – rationality, common benefits, individual values, or established practices – such conventions are effective only in the very
conversations in which participants are willing to let them stand. Inasmuch as the mutual
acceptance of practices of living together is a
matter of ethics by definition, successful
accounts provide narratives that participants
in conversation consider ethical. Thus, in
repairing problematic conversations, conversation-specific ethical narratives are proposed, tested, and accepted, i.e., narratives
that participants can live with and find no reason to object to. The ethics that emerges in
repaired conversations has two remarkable
features. It is rarely generalizable to all conversations – effectively denying their universality; for example, the universal pragmatics
of communication proposed by Habermas
(1970) – and it cannot be represented by any
one observer’s or participant’s cognitive construction. Conversational ethical realities are
performed in conversations or interactively
constructed.
Accounts may be personal, “I was angry,”
informational, “I didn’t know that,” related to
efficiency, “this is all I could afford,” ethical, “I
didn’t want to hurt her,” moral, “everyone
does it,” pragmatic, “it worked in the past,” or
institutional, “this is the approved procedure.”
Problematic conversations can be considered repaired when they resume their natural
flow. However, conversations are not
machines that can be fixed by replacing defec-

tive parts. Successful repairs have the potential of leaving memorable residues behind, an
awareness of what happened and how it was
resolved. Such residues may become part of
the history of a conversation and direct that
conversation’s future along paths not taken
without prior repairs. Therefore, a history of
successful repairs holds the seeds of conventional accounting practices in terms of which
future problematic conversational moves
may become explained, justified, excused, or
apologized for.
Thus, unless the history of repairs is forgotten, repaired conversation may no longer
be quite authentic and I would argue this condition to be most common in naturally occurring conversations.

Degeneration of
conversation
While language always provides ample
resources for repairing untoward conversational moves or actions, this is not to say that
all disruptions of the flow of interactions are
indeed repaired. Not repairing problematic
conversations is not limited to children who
are in the process of developing accounting
competencies. It applies to competent speakers as well. Failing to repair conversations that
have turned problematic has two important
social consequences. On the one hand, participants who do not hold each other accountable for what they say or do, whether for reasons of expediency or fear of reprisals, grant
implicit permission to continue the untoward
practices, which can lead to their tacit legitimization. On the other hand, participants
who refuse to give adequate accounts when
requested of them claim exceptional privileges, in effect, which can lead to the institution of inequalities and violate the dialogical
equality that authentic conversation requires.
There may be reasonable and unfortunate
conditions for not practicing accountability.
Temporarily suspending conversation to get
something more important accomplished
might be considered reasonable – as long as
this suspension is temporary and mutually
consented to. Entrapment of one by another
– threads of exclusion from a conversation,
induction of fear of retribution, and exercising authority – is always unfortunate because
acquiescence inevitably creates burdensome
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interpersonal relationships that are incompatible with authentic conversation. The
unwillingness to repair problematic conversations is the root cause of conversations
descending into other forms of interaction, as
I shall exemplify below. The results of such
degenerations are where conventional sociological abstractions start – without adequate
reflection on their roots in conversations.
There are innumerably many ways a conversation can degenerate into other forms of
social interactions. I can offer only a few
examples.
Physical constraints

The most benign and not entirely social in
nature are physical constraints. Conversations become increasingly difficult when
noise competes with participants’ ability to
listen to each other’s voices, or when the number of participants grows too large for speakers to address individual participants or to
distinguish individual voices, for example at
mass rallies, political demonstrations, or
public performances. In such situations, participants acquire collective identities that
divide participants into, say, performers and
audiences or demonstrators and police.
Dialogical inequalities

Most obviously, authentic conversation
degenerates by tolerating dialogical inequalities. Interruptions of a speaker’s turn can happen carelessly, but they also may be part of
accepted discourse practices. For example, it
is well known that men interrupt women
more often than the reverse. Numerous explanations have been suggested, including a prevailing acceptance of patriarchy. More clearly
explainable dialogical inequalities occur at
board meetings. Authentic conversation
among equals disappears as soon as the CEO
or a person in charge of the meeting enters.
Such situations are often explained in terms of
unequal distribution of power. Power, however, is not what superiors have and subordinates lack. It is not measurable by unequal
access to material resources but manifests
itself in the unwillingness to hold authorities
accountable for what they say or do, and, its
complement, in the refusal to provide
accounts when requested (Krippendorff
2009: 131–155). Power arises when accountability is not exercised and subsequent interactions are tolerated.
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Therapists have sometimes been characterized as conversation managers, which
makes therapy different from conversation.
Managing focus groups or group discussions,
for example, by instructing participants to list
their ideas on a predefined issue, putting
them on public display, and then proceeding
to group them gives the impression of dialogic equality by granting every participant a
voice while leaving the moderator in charge of
the process. Widely practiced in marketing
research and used as a qualitative method for
generating data in the social sciences, such
methods elicit information that is biased by
the management of the group’s interactions,
revealing something very different from what
people would express in unconstrained conversations.
Inauthentic questions

I suggested that asking questions with
unknown answers creates possibilities for
participants to choose their contributions
and experience respect when their answers are
acknowledged by responding to them. But
questions may be inauthentic as well. Knowledge tests, for example, whether administered
in educational settings, aptitude tests for hiring employees, or scientific research, are not
geared to understanding but to establishing a
respondent’s comprehension, the criteria for
which reside in the questioner. Asking questions to which the answers are known is consistent with conceptualizing communication
as the accurate transmission of information
from one mind to another – a process that is
institutionalized in many educational and
administrative situations that have nothing to
do with conversation.
In public opinion research, interviewees
are asked to commit themselves to answer an
interviewer’s questions, and to give up their
conversationally expected ability to ask questions of their own. In this genre of social
research, questions are standardized for all
interviewees, asked according to a schedule,
and a prepared set of answers conforms to the
interest to the sponsors of the research. Whatever results from such interviews has less to do
with what people would say to each other than
with what sponsors want to hear (Krippendorff 2005) – a seriously biased investigative
technique. Talk show hosts on radio or television are notoriously in charge of what counts
as appropriate to the institutionalized genre

they enact. They define the topic, ask the
questions, interrupt as they see fit, including
signaling the audience to applaud. Talk show
guests tend to go along with these inauthenticities for the publicity this affords them on a
show.
Institutionalized interactions

Mariaelena Bartesaghi (2009a), studying
therapists’ use of questions during therapeutic sessions, found less obvious inauthenticities. The therapeutic use of questions may
give clients the impression that the therapist
is genuinely interested in their problems, but
systematically directs the clients’ answers to
where therapists wants to go with them. She
defines therapy as an institutionalized form of
interaction. Therapy includes avoiding
answering clients’ questions, for instance: Client: “Why can’t I see you on Monday?” Therapist: “That seems to disturb you, doesn’t it?”
(Lakoff 1990: 69).
Referring to participants in terms of
stereotypical categories

When addressing each other or some participants in social categories, for example, as a
(typical) woman, black, Frenchman, gay,
mental patient, catholic, or consumer, the
ensuing interaction is no longer among
mutually respecting individuals but between
social categories in terms of which participants are expected to reply. Peter Berger and
Thomas Luckmann (1966) discuss these
social categories as “typifications.” It would be
difficult to hold categories accountable for
what their members say and do. Similarly,
when participants in conversations come to
divide themselves into opposing camps with
ideological, party political, or ethnic labels,
for example, into progressive and conservative politicians, often resulting in the use of
plural pronouns – the inclusive “we” and the
exclusive “they” – communication becomes
interactions among publically identified collectivities and conversation is, at best, a wrong
metaphor. Party politics attests to perfectly
reasonable individuals adopting ideological
voices.
Even deliberatively avoiding public stereotypes can degrade authentic conversation.
John Jackson (2008) explores the unintended
consequences of political correctness in the
United States. By confining the use of racial
stereotypes to conversations in the privacy of
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one’s home, public discourse becomes disingenuous and the realities it constructs schizophrenic, not resolving the racial tension that
political correctness was thought to alleviate.
This phenomenon also exemplifies how the
invocation of normative theories about
proper talk in public can destroy the authenticity of conversation.
Institutionalizing reality

Bartesaghi (2009b) identifies several strategies that therapists apply to establish their
authority vis-à-vis their clients. Some
authority is already presupposed in the very
act of clients seeking therapeutic advice. But
in therapy sessions, this authority needs to be
realized in talk. Therapeutic authority
derives largely from using a vocabulary that
is institutionalized in therapeutic discourse
in which therapists claim expertise. Therapists are trained to reframe clients’ personal
narratives in professional terms, constructing a psychotherapeutic reality for them that
therapists can treat with the institutional
resources they command and clients lack.
This practice renders clients as incompetent
narrators of their own world. Bartesaghi
made three important observations. (1) The
therapists she observed managed to prevent
being held accountable to their clients by hiding behind the professional community of
therapists, referring to themselves in terms of
the collective “we,” having “years of experience,” and professional affiliations. That
community is physically absent from the
therapeutic session. Channeled into the conversation by the therapist leaves the client no
chance to address that community directly.
(2) By applying institutionally established
therapeutic theories to the social life of clients – theories of the clients’ mental and
emotional states that they are not expected to
know – client accounts are rendered unreliable or flawed. This gives therapists (3) the
justification for replacing clients’ narratives,
feelings, and social problems with institutional
accounts that enable treating clients as individuals by therapeutic means.
Therapeutic discourse is not the only discourse that constructs institutional realities
that clients are asked to accept on the therapists’ authority and with their help. Scientists, too, tend to claim possession of the
instruments for establishing objective truths,
realities that laypersons must accept on
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account of the scientific authority articulating their truths. Teachers assume their
authority vis-à-vis their students by claiming
to have valuable knowledge that students
need to acquire. Literary scholars presume
the ability to interpret texts in ways that
untrained readers cannot and authors may
not be aware of. For example, Paul Ricoeur’s
(1970) “hermeneutic of suspicion” insists on
characterizing authors as hiding their agenda
behind their writing, which has given literary
scholars the professional license to construct
what could underlie a text regardless of what
its author says it means. In effect, this scholarship thrives on institutionalizing what has
been called “conspiracy theory.” It permits
scholars to not listen to how others – readers
and authors – interpret the text they are analyzing. Conspirators must, by definition,
deny being one. It follows that an author’s
denial of the suspected intentions can be
interpreted as evidence for the validity of the
suspicion – a cognitive trap. One cannot converse with institutionalized realities, only
with people willing to consider them as mere
hypotheses, which is what social constructivism advocates.
Not confining accountability to those
present in conversations is a premise of sociological theorizing. Besides what I mentioned
above, there are at least three ways this can
happen and it would be important to recognize the linguistic ground, as Habermas
(2001) does, that makes sociology possible.
Speaking for absent others

When therapists rearticulate their client’s
stories in therapeutic terms, therapists and
clients are at least co-present. It is conceivable; therefore, that they could hold each
other accountable should the evolving conversation go astray. Even institutionalized
realities can be contested, although I am told
that clients in therapy rarely ever do this in
their sessions, which is not to rule out the
possibility of expressing their misgivings in
conversations with trusted friends. However,
when speaking for absent others, speakers
usurp the voices of individuals who, perhaps
conveniently excluded from a conversation,
can neither be questioned within that conversation nor be held accountable for their
views as channeled into a conversation by one
participant. Noble intents notwithstanding,
speaking for the poor, oppressed, minorities,

victims of crime, or even for familiar
acquaintances is a discourse strategy in which
speakers claim to have more voices than their
own. When compellingly asserted, this gives
speakers rhetorical strengths over those who
cannot claim such backing. Reporting
rumors or something overheard may not
have much weight, but claiming to speak for
one’s boss during a contentious meeting can
convert a conversation among equals into a
game of usurped, claimed, perhaps invented
voices, which is no longer between authentic
participants.
Speaking as representatives of others

I.e., individuals, organizations, movements,
or governments. Lawyers represent their clients in court mainly because untrained individuals believe they do not have the knowhow to navigate themselves through the legal
system. In taking on a case, lawyers translate
their client’s stories into legally valid narratives that a court is designed to handle and to
which clients are asked to submit for fear of
failing. In this process, clients become legal
categories – plaintiffs, defendants, or witnesses – whose roles are circumscribed by
being treated as their category and forced to
respond accordingly. Politicians in democratic governments often face the difficult
choice between speaking their conscience or
in the name of the constituencies that elected
them. The latter has the advantage of giving
those with larger constituencies more clout
and allows them to defer voting until after
consulting with their constituency. In all of
these cases, interactions are constrained by
the process of representation. Therefore, a
parliament is not a place for conversations
but for institutionalized debates, public posturing, behind door negotiations, compromises, and voting in the name of absent others.
Speaking as the occupant of an ofﬁce

In social organizations, members are
assigned to offices that serve particular functions with responsibilities for coordinating
the work of subordinates. Occupants of an
office dedicate all communications to the
purpose of that office, speak from that position, not for themselves, and expect all subordinates to be accountable to them without
challenging their office. The transitivity of
such asymmetrical accounting practices cre-
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ates and maintains organizational hierarchies, such as in business, government, the
military, and even the Catholic Church.
Office holders are not addressed as individuals, as would be expected in conversations,
but as part of a hierarchy of which that office
is a part. Such hierarchies tend to be
described in terms of power relations.
Through such transitively unequal accounting practices, intra-organizational interactions are coordinated and directed towards
organizational goals. Thus, organizational
communication deviates markedly from the
mutual accountability in conversations and
therefore deserves special attention. In the
social sciences, that attention largely comes
from sociology, which rarely acknowledges
how organizational realities are reconstituted
by actors (Krippendorff 2008b) and maintained in communication.

Discourse as constrained
conversation
I use “discourse” to describe what conversations can become when untoward conversational moves are not accounted for or
repaired. Discourse surfaces when interactions become systematized, organized, institutionalized, and no longer open to everything its participants may have to say; when
dialogical equality is replaced by asymmetrical communications; when the insistence on
consistencies constrains the creativities that
authentic conversations afford their participants; and when self-organization (communicational closure) is replaced by hierarchies
of asymmetrical accounting practices outside
the present interactions. Elsewhere, I have
written about “discourse as systematically
constrained conversation” (Krippendorff
2009: 217–236) of which I can outline here
only its principal features.
To be clear, when saying that conversation
descends, degenerates, or erodes into discourse, I do not wish to imply that discourse
is an undesirable form of languaging. We
know many discourses that have made contemporary society more livable. We have reasons to be proud of scientific discourse, public discourse, legal discourse, design
discourse, and the discourse of cybernetics
(Krippendorff 2008c), to name but a few.
While these discourses can be enormously

productive, I do suggest that conversations
open spaces for people to realize each other as
human beings, that conversational competencies precede discursive practices developmentally (children need to acquire conversational competencies before becoming
competent in a particular discourse), etymologically (the vocabularies of discourses tend
to go back to generations of speakers), and
epistemologically (personal experiences that
enter conversations may become displaced
by discursive constructions of reality).
Therefore conversation should not be
ignored when theorizing human communication in general and human participation in
social organizations (Krippendorff 2008b),
science, and culture, in particular.
According to earlier distinctions, there are
five constitutive features of discourse.
B Discourses surface in the artifacts they
construct, including the body of their texts.
The discourse of physics constructs a logically
consistent universe amenable to observation
and causal explanations; that of medicine,
one of diseased or debilitated human bodies
open to cures or surgical interventions; that of
design, one of future technologies of everyday
life. Discourse-specific vocabularies are standardized building blocks for constructing
such artifacts. The body of artifacts that a discourse attends to needs to remain open to
rearticulation, recombination, and creative
extensions, or else the discourse dies for lack
of space. Traditional discourse analysts limit
their attention to available texts. I maintain
this to be insufficient. Texts are read and
embedded in talk among particular people
and acted upon. The artifacts that discourses
generate include all of their visible and somewhat enduring manifestations, not just texts
but also discourse-specific universes, professional practices, and technologies. These artifacts are co-constructed in interpersonal
interactions, which, while inconceivable
without individual cognition are not intelligible in terms of cognitive processes.
However, unlike the traditional emphasis
of discourse analysis, these artifacts alone are
not sufficient for understanding the operation of a discourse; hence there are four additional features of discourse.
B Discourses are kept alive within a community of their practitioners. Texts need to be
read, reread, reinterpreted, reconstructed,
and updated by members of a discourse com-
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munity specializing in that practice. Texts
have no meaning without readers and the
artifacts of a discourse are rendered meaningful primarily by the members of a discourse
community that has created and used them in
their midst as well as by users outside the discourse. A discourse community is self-organizing by legitimizing its own practices,
including creating and maintaining standards for reading, writing, interpretation, and
construction of their own realities, conditions
for membership in the discourse community,
and criteria for attributing meanings to the
activities of its members. For example, the
medical discourse community trains future
members, certifies its practitioners, determines codes of conduct and defines the criteria for good medical research. All discourse
communities are autonomous and pursue
their distinct identities.
B Discourses institute their recurrent practices. This is to say that discourse-specific
practices – courses of education, applicable
methods and techniques, media of publications, awards for outstanding accomplishments, etc. – are codified, institutionalized,
and maintained as the preferred practices of
members of the discourse community and
maintained in the name of that community.
Social science publications, for example, are
carefully evaluated by editors and reviewers,
encourage a common vocabulary, allow
younger members to qualify for promotion,
and assure the efficiency of constructing discursive artifacts. Theorists refer to their predecessors, research methods build on each
other, intervention strategies are improved
over time – all of which contribute to an institutionalized history of discourse practices,
which has the benefit of avoiding the duplication of innovations, standardizes methods,
typifies expertise, and thus serves to make the
discourse more efficient.
B Discourses draw their own boundaries,
deciding who and what belongs and what
does not. Some discourses identify themselves by reference to the construction of a
particular class of artifacts – biologists, for
example, are concerned with what they construct as living organisms; others are committed to applying particular theories – physicists, for example, are committed to causal
explanations and the construction of a consistent universe; still others are dedicated to
solve particular problems – engineering, for
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example, seeking technological solutions to
all kinds of problems, including social ones.
B Discourses justify their practices to outsiders. Justifications may be motivated by the
need to continually recruit new members for
the discourse community to remain viable,
mobilize the resources necessary to construct
their artifacts and promote their use by others. But justifications also provide the perhaps unintended ground for driving various
discourse dynamics. One may note discourses that compete with one another, as
science and religion did until the discourse of
religion found a niche that resists scientific
penetration. Some discourses consider
themselves foundationalist, such as physics
claiming that everything real is physical in
nature and everything else is inferior science
or fiction. Some discourses colonize others,
as cognitive science has been doing lately to
psychology.

Computation
If discourse emerges when constraints on
authentic conversation are naturalized, talk
becomes institutionalized, and unequal
accounting practices are accepted and
directed to the construction of discursive artifacts, then the implementation of technological solutions to social problems or the
replacement of social practices by more efficient mechanisms can be considered a move
from discourse to the entirely non-linguistic
processes of computation. Today, we are witnessing the massive translation of discursive
practices into efficient computational mechanisms: delegating repetitive work to robotic
devices, searching for relevant texts on the
internet with search engines, scheduling airplane traffic, letting computers buy and sell
stocks, using online accounting for the essential variables of social organizations, and
automating whole businesses. In the same
way, statistical software in the social sciences
has replaced seemingly endless and error
prone hand calculations by teams of researchers, and electronic banking accomplishes
what a social network of coordinated bank
employees did before the advent of computers. These replacements are driven by the
increasing availability of software, discursively developed by armies of collaborating
programmers.

Software is written in a computer language and explicates algorithms, i.e., step-bystep instructions in which all conceivable
paths are anticipated and by means of which
receptive hardware can be programmed to be
a purposefully functioning machine. Much
like in discourse, where it does not matter
who practices it as long as someone does,
computation is not tied to particular material
manifestations as long as it works. In other
words, the material makeup of hardware is
irrelevant to its proceeding from state to state
in a determinist fashion. Hence, software
specifies a deterministic process, rendering
computers deterministic machines that cannot choose what they do. They have no
agency. Non-digital technologies – simple
tools, cars, hospitals, public performances –
may not be programmable as computers are,
but their design has always focused on how
they go from here to there, what, in the digital
world, is called “computation,” hence my use
of this term.
All conversations, discourses, and computations produce something. The products of
conversations and discourses are still coordinated by talk, text, and interactions. Computations, however, once initiated by human
actors, run their course unless intervened
with at their interfaces. People may blindly
accept the results of computations and allow
themselves to be affected by these devices, but
this is a user’s choice, not a necessity.
Because of the difficulty of grasping the
complexities of computational devices, we
often attribute human qualities to them –
intelligence, temperaments, likes and dislikes (Turkle 1984, 2007; Reeves & Nass
1996), and the ability to act (Latour 2005).
However, such attributions do not change
the deterministic nature of computational
artifacts. One cannot hold computers
accountable for what they do. Therefore,
replacing discursive practices with computational technologies and relying on them in
everyday life amounts to a fundamental shift
away from human participation. It is truly
amazing to realize how many discourses
depend on digitally mediated communication and computation and how little the
social sciences have conceptualized this fact
of social life or how they have confused the
two as Latour (2005) does. Here, cybernetics
has much to explore and many insights to
offer.

145

01
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
09
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55

Klaus Krippendorff
Conversation

01
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
09
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55

© Constructivist Foundations

Figure 1: Continuum of linguistic/interactive participation.

Conclusion
To sum up, Figure 1 depicts a continuum
between the extremes of authentic conversation and computation, populated by discourse formations of varying degrees of rigor.
Conversational competencies include, as I
suggested, the ability to repair untoward
moves that speakers may make, which can
bring discourses back to conversations and
the latter to authentic ones. But by not repairing problematic encounters when they occur,
by consenting to limit accountability for
problematic actions, conversations unwittingly drift into discursive forms that may well
construct realities of a kind that conversations
cannot construct – think of sophisticated
information systems, highways, and the infrastructure of cities. The evolution of such artifacts is accomplished by discourses that coordinate large numbers of human participants,
including over some time. It follows that
social artifacts of such complexity cannot possibly be explained by the cognitive constructions of an observer or of any one of its constituent creators, users, or stakeholders. What
participants do know is their own creative but
always only partial contributions. The
remainder consists of trust in the linguistic
competence of the other participants to coordinate their understanding and interact
towards what is to be done. In the transition
from conversation to discourse, conversational possibilities are traded for practical
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conveniences. In the transition from discourse to computation, seemingly costly,
unpleasant, or inefficient discursive practices
are implemented in mechanisms whose ultimate consequences may be difficult to foresee.
I am suggesting that the move from conversation through the large domain of discursive forms is attracted by the ultimate temptation of turning social processes into
productive algorithms whose operation in
various technologies is no longer social,
except before their inception and subsequently, at occasional interventions through
multi-user interfaces with them. Since computational artifacts often are beyond individual understanding of how they work, such
technologies can no longer be treated as tools
under rational control of their creators and
users. Uncritical reliance on computation can
lead communities into unintended realities
that may well become unbearable to live in
and therefore constitute an important
domain of scholarly and designerly attention.
This essay is intended to expand the limits
of radical cognitive constructivism, which
confines itself to individual understanding,
into the social domain, and introduce doubts
in the epistemological position of observers at
the expense of participatory and interactive
reality constructions. I maintain that human
realities, including the idea of cognition, are
conversational or discursive realities in the
sense that we humans interactively participate in their construction – without being in

charge or fully cognizant of each other’s conceptions, except for our contribution to them.
I hope that readers of this essay consider
conversation – not individual cognition and
efforts to describe one’s observations – as the
essentially human way of living together. Following from that, is the awareness of the often
casually accepted drift from conversation
through various discursive forms to computation. I invite readers to draw finer distinctions within the domain of discourses and reflect on how their own contributions affect
the spaces left to exercise accountability along
this sometimes appealing journey. Although
computation deserves more attention than I
could devote here, it should be recognizable as
that which early cybernetics thrived on and
proposed in the form of theories, models, and
mechanisms for augmenting social reality.
Computation undoubtedly has vastly expanded the horizon of our abilities, but it can
also constrain human agency. When moving
through various discourses, converting recurrent social practices into computational artifacts, we should always preserve the possibility of returning to authentic conversation, its
sheer pleasure and fundamental humanness.
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